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During voluntary hand movement, we sense that we generate the movement and that
the hand is a part of our body. These feelings of control over bodily actions, or the sense
of agency, and the ownership of body parts are two fundamental aspects of the way we
consciously experience our bodies. However, little is known about how these processes
are functionally linked. Here, we introduce a version of the rubber hand illusion in which
participants control the movements of the index ﬁnger of a model hand, which is in full
view, by moving their own right index ﬁnger.We demonstrated that voluntary ﬁnger move-
ments elicit a robust illusion of owning the rubber hand and that the senses of ownership
and agency over the model hand can be dissociated. We systematically varied the rel-
ative timing of the ﬁnger movements (synchronous versus asynchronous), the mode of
movement (active versus passive), and the position of the model hand (anatomically con-
gruent versus incongruent positions). Importantly, asynchrony eliminated both ownership
and agency, passive movements abolished the sense of agency but left ownership intact,
and incongruent positioning of the model hand diminished ownership but did not elimi-
nate agency. These ﬁndings provide evidence for a double dissociation of ownership and
agency, suggesting that they represent distinct cognitive processes. Interestingly, we also
noted that the sense of agency was stronger when the hand was perceived to be a part
of the body, and only in this condition did we observe a signiﬁcant correlation between
the subjects’ ratings of agency and ownership. We discuss this in the context of possible
differences between agency over owned body parts and agency over actions that involve
interactions with external objects. In summary, the results obtained in this study using a
simple moving rubber hand illusion paradigm extend previous ﬁndings on the experience
of ownership and agency and shed new light on their relationship.
Keywords: sense of ownership, sense of agency, rubber hand illusion, self-recognition, body perception, multisen-
sory integration, volition, voluntary movement
INTRODUCTION
In normal situations, we all perceive that our body is our own and
that we can control its movements voluntarily. If you ask a child
“can you move your hand?,” the child will likely reply “of course I
can move my hand.”We do not usually question the experience of
the body as a part of the self or the fact that we control the actions
of our bodies, even as young children. It has been argued in var-
ious ﬁelds, such as psychology, philosophy and cognitive science,
that these particular experiences of one’s own body are of critical
importance to the conscious experience of the self (Merlau-Ponty,
1945; Chiel and Beer, 1997; Gallagher, 2000, 2005; Churchland,
2002; Graziano and Botvinick, 2002; Jeannerod, 2003; Haggard,
2005). Current cognitive neuroscience research indicates that these
two basic aspects of an individual’s self-perception of the body are
critically important for self-consciousness: the experience of the
body as one’s own, which is referred to as the sense of “body own-
ership” (Gallagher, 2005; Makin et al., 2008; Ehrsson, 2012), and
the sense of authorship over bodily movements, termed the sense
of “agency”(Blakemore and Frith, 2003;Haggard, 2005; Gallagher,
2007; David et al., 2008; Synofzik et al., 2008a). The experience of
themovement of a bodypart that is not self-generated indicates the
presence of an external force, which in turn may imply a potential
threat, such as being grabbed by an enemy. Similarly,manual inter-
actionswith environmental objects and the generationof defensive
actions to avoid potential threats require the ability to identify and
localize the limbs in space (Graziano andCooke,2006). Thus, from
an evolutionary perspective, the abilities that allow us to experi-
ence the causal origin of actions and sense the boundary between
one’s body and the external world are crucial. However, in the
majority of everyday situations, we experience the senses of own-
ership and agency as intimately coupled. How are these processes
structured and how do they interact? Are the sensations of owner-
ship and agency two fundamentally different processes, or might
a single process explain both of these bodily experiences?
The sense of ownership is assumed to rely on the integration of
sensory signals from different modalities (Botvinick, 2004; Makin
et al., 2008; Ehrsson, 2012) or so-called “multisensory integra-
tion” (Holmes and Spence, 2005; Stein and Stanford, 2008). When
the spatial, temporal, visual and somatic signals received from a
limb all match, a feeling of ownership then arises for this limb.
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This phenomenon has been demonstrated convincingly in stud-
ies investigating the rubber hand illusion (Botvinick and Cohen,
1998). In this illusion, a rubber hand is placed in full view on a
table in front of the participant and touched in synchrony with
touches applied to the participant’s hand, which is hidden behind
a screen. After a short period of such repetitive visuo-tactile stim-
ulation, the majority of participants begin to feel the touch where
they see it on the rubber hand rather than where it is applied to
their real hand and develop a feeling that the rubber hand is their
own hand. Asynchronous stimulation of the two hands abolishes
the illusion (Shimada et al., 2009b), as does placing the rubber
hand in an anatomically implausible position (Ehrsson et al., 2004;
Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005). Hence, both a temporal correlation
between visual and tactile signals and a match between the visual
and perceived static positions of the hands are necessary to elicit
the illusion of ownership (Tsakiris andHaggard,2005;Makin et al.,
2008; Ehrsson, 2012).
How is the sense of agency over our movements produced?
Frith et al. (2000) suggested that the comparator/central monitor-
ing process used for the optimal sensorimotor control of action
(Wolpert and Miall, 1996; Wolpert and Ghahramani, 2000) may
also be responsible for generating the sense of agency. This model
is based on the premise that every voluntary movement is accom-
panied by an efferent copy, which is used to compute the expected
sensory consequences. The comparison of the efferent copy with
the actual feedback thus enables the agent to distinguish between
internally and externally generated sensations (von Holst and Mit-
telstaedt, 1950; Bays et al., 2005; Crapse and Sommer, 2008). If the
efferent copy and feedback match, then the movement has been
performed as intended. If the perceived feedback clearly violates
the expected outcome, then the participant becomes aware of this
discrepancy and does not experience authorship of the action (van
den Bos and Jeannerod, 2002; Farrer et al., 2008b). Disturbances
of this comparator process have been suggested to underlie the
abnormal experience of movements in pathological conditions
(Frith et al., 2000; Franck et al., 2001; Blakemore and Frith, 2003;
Shergill et al., 2005; Voss et al., 2010).
However, it has also been argued that the sense of agency has a
more complex structure, with multiple levels, presumably involv-
ing different processes (for further discussion, see Haggard et al.,
2002; Jeannerod, 2003; David et al., 2008; Synofzik et al., 2008a,b).
In particular,motor intentions,which are potentially related to the
direct, conscious experience of preparatory motor commands in
premotor areas (Lau et al., 2004, 2007), may also be crucial to the
sense of agency (e.g., Haggard et al., 2002; Haggard, 2005). More-
over, matching between the intention to act and the perception of
action goals has also been proposed to be a general mechanism
supporting the sense of agency (Wegner et al., 2004; Sato, 2009).
Most cognitive neuroscience studies of agency make no funda-
mental distinction between the simple movements of limbs and
goal-directed actions that involve tool use or manual interactions
with objects in the environment (such as lifting a cup of tea).
Indeed, the arbitrary mapping of motor intentions and sensory
events can be learned (Sato andYasuda, 2005; Sato, 2009; Spengler
et al., 2009) and thereafter predicted, and novel internal models
can be acquired to facilitate tool use (Imamizu et al., 2000;Wolpert
et al., 2011), extending the principles of the comparator model to
object-directed actions. Nevertheless, one might ask whether the
agency of simple movements of one’s body and the agency of
changes in the sensory environment resulting from bodily actions
actually correspond to the same process.When you raise your arm,
you experience your will as being the causative agent of the arm’s
motion. This type of agency over one’s body (hereinafter referred
to as “body agency”) was described by Wittgenstein in his famous
analysis of the phenomenology of willed acts (Wittgenstein, 1958).
However, unlike “body agency,” agency during interactions with
environmental objects and during tool use is not necessarily con-
ﬁned to parts of one’s body, and an initial learning period is
required for the arbitrary mapping of action and external effect
(hereinafter referred to as“external agency”). Many contemporary
studies, however, do not address the potential differences between
body agency and external agency, and unsurprisingly, the various
approaches in the study of agency differ in this particular aspect
(Gallagher, 2007; David et al., 2008).
Previous studies aiming to investigate the ownership of mov-
ing hands have used video recording technology, in which the
motion of the participant’s hand is recorded and images of this
moving hand are displayed on a screen in front of the participant
(Tsakiris et al., 2006). However, Ijsselsteijn et al. (2005) reported
signiﬁcantly weaker ratings of ownership with 2D images of hands
projected onto a screen than with the classic illusion involving
a physical model of the hand. More recent studies employing
sophisticated virtual reality technology(Slater et al., 2008, 2009;
Sanchez-Vives et al., 2010) or advanced on-line image manipula-
tion software, such as the Mirage system (Newport and Preston,
2010; Newport et al., 2009), suggest that it is possible to elicit
feelings of ownership with moving virtual hands. However, the
extent to which the effects of the classic rubber hand illusion can
be fully reproduced with areal moving model hand without the
use of advanced technology remains somewhat unclear. It is thus
important to examine if this is the case as a central prediction of
multisensory models of body ownership (Ehrsson, 2012) is that
correlations between somatic and visual feedback during natural
ﬁnger movements should also produce ownership sensations, and
we cannot assume that the results obtained from virtual reality
simulations will always extend to physical reality because the tech-
nology used may inﬂuence the reported percepts. One important
exception is a study by Dummer et al. (2009; see also the recent
“rubber ﬁnger” experiment by Walsh et al., 2011), who described
experiments in which participants gave high ratings of ownership
when a physical model of the moving hand was used. Unfortu-
nately, in this study, no objective evidence for the illusion was
reported.
A more serious limitation of the previous studies is that they
were not designed to directly dissociate ownership and agency in
a single rubber hand illusion paradigm (Tsakiris and Haggard,
2005; Dummer et al., 2009; Kammers et al., 2009; Longo and
Haggard, 2009). Tsakiris et al. (2006) compared the strength of
ownership, as measured by proprioceptive drift alone, in video-
based conditions with active movements, passive movements, or a
version of the classic rubber hand illusion in which relaxed hands
were brushed. The rationale behind this approach was to exam-
ine whether the sense of agency, which is present during active
(ownership and agency) but not passive movements (ownership
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only), promoted ownership. The authors reported similar levels
of proprioceptive drift in the three conditions when synchronous
stimulation was compared with the asynchronous control con-
ditions. In this design, agency was always present in the context
of ownership; in other words, no condition with agency without
ownership was included. Therefore, it was not possible to test for
double dissociation between ownership and agency or to examine
possible differences between agency over one’s limbs and external
objects.
In the present study, we introduce a version of the rubber hand
illusion in which participants “move” the index ﬁnger of a physi-
cal (wooden) model hand by moving their own index ﬁnger and
describe how this paradigm results in a strong illusion of owner-
ship, quantiﬁed by both subjective and objective measures. In the
ﬁrst series of experiments (Experiments 1 and 2), we manipulated
the relative timing of visual and somatic feedback. As synchrony
is known to play crucial roles in both the sense of ownership and
the sense of agency, we hypothesized that asynchronous sensory
feedback would effectively eliminate both ownership and agency
and thereby serve as a control condition.
In a second series of experiments (Experiments 3 and 4), we
tested the hypothesis that ownership and agency represent dif-
ferent processes and can therefore be dissociated. To this end,
the mode of movement generation (active versus passive) and
the position of the model hand with respect to the participant’s
body (anatomically congruent versus incongruent positions) were
manipulated in a 2× 2 factorial design. Our prediction was that
passive movements would eliminate agency but have no inﬂuence
on ownership, whereas an anatomically incongruent hand pos-
ture would eliminate ownership but leave agency intact. In the
context of the last prediction, we reasoned that because agency
can be experienced during tool use and object-directed actions,
it should also be maintained when moving a ﬁnger that does not
feel like a part of one’s body. Our results support our hypotheses
and provide evidence of a (double) dissociation between owner-
ship and agency. Furthermore, our factorial design allowed us to
directly compare the agency sensed over an owned limb (body
agency) with the agency sensed over an external object (external
agency). Our results suggest that agency over a part of one’s body
is more vivid and more tightly linked with ownership than agency
over an external object. This ﬁnding provides preliminary sup-
port that body agency and external agency may involve different
processes.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
SUBJECTS
A total of 104 healthy, experimentally naïve participants were
tested in four separate experiments. Experiment 1 included 20
participants (nine males,mean age 24.5 years, SD± 4.4). In Exper-
iment 2, another 20 participants were tested (eight males, mean
age 30.5 years, SD± 12.6). The third and fourth experiments each
involved testing 32 participants (Experiment 3: 15males,mean age
24.8 years, SD± 5.8; Experiment 4:14 males, mean age 27.2 years,
SD± 8.1). No volunteers participated in more than one experi-
ment. All participants provided written informed consent prior
to participation. The study methodology was approved by the
Regional Ethical Review Board of Stockholm (www.epn.se).
APPARATUS AND PROCEDURES
Participants sat at a table and put their right hand into a wooden
box (see Figure 1; dimensions 35 cm× 25 cm× 12 cm) placed
30 cm in front of them. The participant sat comfortably in this
position, with the right hand and arm outstretched so that the tip
of the index ﬁnger was approximately 50 cm from the shoulder. A
life-sized wooden model of a human hand was placed above the
box. The model hand measured 20 cm in length (from the end of
the wrist to the tip of the middle ﬁnger) and was covered with
a latex glove. Subjects wore identical latex gloves on their right
hands. A plastic ﬁnger cap was placed on the tip of the index ﬁn-
ger, which was mechanically connected to the index ﬁnger of the
model hand above the box by a thin wooden rod installed through
a small hole in the box. A blanket was placed over the participant’s
right shoulder to cover the space between the model hand and the
participant and to create a visual scenery for the participant that
the model hand was the participant’s own outstretched hand (see
Figure 1).
Prior to the experiments, the participants were asked to read
written instructions that introduced them to the procedure. The
participants’ task was to tap their right index ﬁnger in a semi-
regular rhythm at approximately 1 Hz. In the passive condition,
however, participants were instructed only to relax their ﬁngers
(see Experiments 3 and 4 below for further details). A strictly
regular rhythm was avoided because such perfectly regular visuo-
somatic correlations were considered to produce weaker illusions
than more irregular patterns (based on anecdotal observations).
Thus, in the present experiment, participants were instructed at
random intervals to occasionally execute a quick “double tap”
instead of a single tap. Participants were brieﬂy trained before
the experiment to perform the tapping in the requested manner,
using a metronome for pacing. The metronome was not present
during the experimental trials. During the experiments, the par-
ticipants were instructed to look at the model hand and focus on
the moving model ﬁnger.
The experimenter sat opposite the participant and moved the
model hand in the asynchronous and passive conditions (see
below). The experimenter’s arm was hidden under a cover so
FIGURE 1 | (A)The setup used to induce the moving rubber hand illusion.
The participant placed his right hand wearing a latex glove into the box. A
wooden model hand wearing an identical latex glove was placed on top of
the box. A blanket covered the space from the participant’s right shoulder
to the right wrist of the model hand. The index ﬁngers of the participant’s
hand and the model hand were mechanically connected by a rod attached
to two small plastic rings on the index ﬁngers. (B) The proprioceptive drift
measure.With eyes closed, the participants indicated where they felt their
right index ﬁnger was located by moving their left index ﬁnger to the
corresponding location on the board.
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that the participant could not see when the experimenter moved
the model index ﬁnger. Indeed, post-experimental debrieﬁngs
revealed that the participants did not develop explicit knowledge
of the mechanism responsible for the movements of the model
hand. After each trial, the experimenter removed the ﬁnger cap
and instructed the participant to withdraw the hand from the box,
move his right hand and arm to completely break the illusion and
then relax for approximately 30–45 s.
CONDITIONS
In the ﬁrst two experiments (1 and 2), the temporal congruence
between the real movements of the index ﬁnger of the partici-
pant and the model hand was manipulated (synchronous versus
asynchronous conditions). In the asynchronous condition, the
connecting rodwas detached from the participant’s ﬁnger cap. The
experimenter now moved the index ﬁnger of the model hand by
moving the rodmanually and introduced an approximately 500 ms
delay with respect to the participant’s movement so that the real
and artiﬁcial ﬁngers appeared to be moving in opposite phases.
In Experiments 3 and 4, a 2× 2 design was applied using
the factors movement mode (active versus passive) and model
hand position (congruent versus incongruent). Thus, the partic-
ipants experienced four different experimental conditions: active
congruent, active incongruent, passive congruent, and passive
incongruent. In these four conditions, the observed movements
of the model hand and the movements of the real ﬁnger were
always synchronous. During the passive movements, the mechan-
ical connection between the model ﬁnger and participant’s ﬁnger
was maintained, and the experimenter moved this connection out
of the view of the participant. Thus, the index ﬁnger of the rub-
ber hand and the participant’s passive index ﬁnger moved up and
down simultaneously in response to an external force. The partic-
ipants were instructed to relax their ﬁngers during this procedure
and not actively participate in the generation of the movements.
The experimenter could verify that the participant was complexly
relaxed by a monitoring the lack of active or reactive forces in the
mechanical device when pulling it up and down. In the incongru-
ent trials, the model hand was rotated 180˚ (as in Ehrsson et al.,
2004) while maintaining the mechanical connection between the
ﬁngers. Importantly, when the model hand was rotated, the posi-
tion of the wooden index ﬁnger was kept constant to ensure a
constant viewing angle and distance from the participant.
In the passive and asynchronous movement conditions, the
experimenter copied the participant’s movements in terms of
amplitude, frequency, and number of double taps to mimic the
characteristics of the participant’s movements from previous trials
or the practice session before the experiment.
MEASURES OF THE ILLUSION
Questionnaires
In Experiments 1 and 3, we used a 16-statement questionnaire
(Table 1). Four statements referred to the feeling of ownership
(e.g., “I felt as if I was looking at my own hand”), and four state-
ments described sensations related to agency (e.g., “I felt as if was
causing the movement I saw”). These statements were adopted
from existing questionnaires used in traditional rubber hand illu-
sion experiments (e.g., Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Longo et al.,
Table 1 |The questionnaire, consisting of 16 statements divided into
four different categories.
Category
Ownership 1. I felt as if I was looking at my own hand*
2. I felt as if the rubber hand was part of my body
3. It seemed as if I were sensing themovement of my
ﬁnger in the location where the rubber ﬁnger moved
4. I felt as if the rubber hand was my hand*
Ownership control 5. I felt as if my real hand were turning rubbery
6. It seems as if I had more than one right hand*
7. It appeared as if the rubber hand were drifting
towards my real hand
8. It felt as if I had no longer a right hand, as if my right
hand had disappeared*
Agency 9.The rubber hand moved just like I wanted it to, as if
it was obeying my will*
10. I felt as if I was controlling the movements of the
rubber hand
11. I felt as if I was causing the movement I saw
12.Whenever Imovedmy ﬁnger I expected the rubber
ﬁnger to move in the same way*
Agency control 13. I felt as if the rubber hand was controlling my will
14. I felt as if the rubber hand was controlling my
movements*
15. I could sense the movement from somewhere
between my real hand and the rubber hand*
16. It seemed as if the rubber hand had a will of
its own
Asterisks indicate questions used in the shorter version of the questionnaire that
was used in Experiments 2 and 4.
2008). The remaining eight statements were control statements,
with four for ownership and four for agency (e.g., “I felt as if
I had more than one right hand” and “It seemed as if the rub-
ber hand had a will of its own”). These served as controls for
task compliancy, suggestibility, and expectancy effects. The con-
trol statements were created based on similar control statements
used in earlier studies of the rubber hand illusion (e.g., Botvinick
and Cohen, 1998; Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008) in that they include
statements that bear several similarities to the illusion-speciﬁc
statements (e.g., includes the word “will” or “hand”) but do
not capture the phenomenological experiences of ownership or
agency. Participants were exposed to 3 min of stimulation for
each individual condition, after which they reported their sub-
jective experience on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from “−3”
(totally disagree) to “+3” (totally agree), with “0” indicating nei-
ther agreement nor disagreement (“uncertain”). In Experiments 2
and 4, we applied a shorter version of the questionnaire to con-
ﬁrm the subjective experience of ownership and agency in these
groups of participants. Here, we only included the most impor-
tant statements related to the perceptions of ownership and agency,
i.e., those that had displayed clear and reliable differences in the
previous experiments, with the aim of examining possible correla-
tions between the illusion categories and proprioceptive drift (see
Table 1).
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To analyze the questionnaire data, the average of the scores for
the four statements related to ownership was computed to obtain
a single “ownership statement” score. Similarly, the “agency state-
ment” score was deﬁned as the mean score of the four statements
related to the sense of agency. The four control statements for
ownership and agency were also averaged to obtain “ownership
control statement” and “agency control statement” scores, respec-
tively. Thus, references in the text to “ownership statements” or
“agency statements” always refer to the average scores of the four
individual statements in the original questionnaires unless explic-
itly stated otherwise. The ownership and agency statement scores
were compared with their corresponding control statements. An
average rating ≥+1 indicates that on the group level, the partici-
pants afﬁrmed the statement, i.e., they had experienced ownership
or agency (this criterion has been used before; see Ehrsson et al.,
2004; Petkova and Ehrsson, 2009).
Proprioceptive drift measure in the pointing task
Experiments 2 and 4 measured the degree of erroneous point-
ing toward the model hand when the participants were asked to
indicate the perceived location of their right index ﬁnger. This
indication served as an objective behavioralmeasure of the illusory
feeling of ownership over the model hand (Botvinick and Cohen,
1998; Ehrsson et al., 2005). Notably, we do not rely on experimen-
tal measures in isolation; we always use them in combination with
the questionnaires. Thus, according to our criteria, the conﬁrma-
tion of the rubber hand illusion would require both a signiﬁcant
proprioceptive drift toward the rubber hand and signiﬁcant afﬁr-
mative rating scores on the questionnaires (see Rohde et al., 2011
for further discussion of the risk of relying on proprioceptive drift
measure alone).
With their eyes closed, participants used their left index ﬁn-
ger to indicate the perceived position (height) of their right index
ﬁnger. Participants were asked to make one rapid but accurate
pointing movement by touching a board attached to the side of
the model hand box (Figure 1B). To identify the position of each
participant’s left index ﬁnger, the board was covered with a sheet
of paper with a millimeter grid, and the experimenter used a pen
to mark the position corresponding to the central part of the par-
ticipant’s ﬁngernail on this paper. The participants were asked to
make one pointing movement before the illusion induction period
and one pointing movement after this period, and the propriocep-
tive drift in the vertical plane was then calculated by subtracting
the position of the ﬁrst pointing from that of the second point-
ing (postpointing minus prepointing). Positive values indicated
an upward drift in the subjects’ sense of the hand’s position, i.e.,
toward the model hand. Each condition was tested three times,
and the average drift across the three trials was computed for each
participant.
The order of the trials was pseudo-randomized and evenly dis-
tributed across the participants. The participants engaged in six
trials in Experiment 2 and a total of 12 trials in Experiment 4.
At the end of each experiment and after the pointing procedures,
each condition was tested one more time (90 s per condition),
and the participants were asked to complete a shorter version of
the questionnaire with eight questions to measure their subjective
experiences (see Table 1). The questionnaire data were collected to
test for possible correlations between the subjectively experienced
strength of ownership and proprioceptive drift (as reported for
the classic rubber hand illusion by Botvinick and Cohen, 1998).
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONNAIRE DATA
All statistical comparisons were based on our a priori hypotheses
unless explicitly mentioned otherwise in the text. In other words,
these tests correspond to planned comparisons unless described
as post hoc tests. The dependent variables were the measures
of ownership and agency, as described in Section “Measures of
the Illusion,” i.e., the questionnaire ratings or the propriocep-
tive drift measure. First, the ownership and agency scores were
separately compared with their respective control statements for
each experimental condition to indicatewhether a signiﬁcant sense
of ownership or agency occurred in each condition. Second, the
ownership and agency statement scoreswere compared across con-
ditions to test for signiﬁcant differences, in accordance with our
hypotheses (see Introduction). Correlation analyses (Spearman
correlations) were also conducted to investigate possible system-
atic relationships between ownership and agency in the various
experimental conditions. We evaluated the hypothesis that a cor-
relation exists between the ownership statement score and the
degree of proprioceptive drift in Experiment 2.
All data were assessed for a normal distribution using the
Shapiro–Wilk test (p> 0.05), and the appropriate non-parametric
tests were applied when one or more of the corresponding data
sets failed to meet the criteria for normal distribution. The ques-
tionnaire data in Experiments 1 and 3 were not normally distrib-
uted; therefore, a Wilcoxon signed-rank test was used for pairwise
comparisons. Multiple pairwise comparisons were conducted in
Experiment 3; therefore, Bonferroni correction was applied. In
Experiment 3, the Friedman test was also used to comparemultiple
conditions. In Experiment 4, we used repeated-measures ANOVA
because the data were normally distributed.
All the tests were two-tailed. Asterisks in the plots indicate
signiﬁcance levels: ∗p< 0.05; ∗∗p< 0.01; and ∗∗∗p< 0.001. All
analyses were conducted using the SPSS software package (version
19, SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL, USA).
RESULTS
EXPERIMENT 1: QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS FOR THE SYNCHRONOUS
VERSUS ASYNCHRONOUS MOVEMENTS
The questionnaire data clearly indicated that, at the group level,
the participants experienced a strong illusion of ownership over
themodel hand and a strong sense of agency over itsmovements in
the synchronous condition, with 75% of the participants afﬁrm-
ing the illusion of ownership (i.e., an ownership score ≥+1). The
mean ratings for ownership (1.63, SD± 1.27) and agency (2.44,
SD± 0.56) were well above +1 in this condition. In contrast,
the mean ratings were well below +1 in the asynchronous con-
dition (ownership=−0.99, SD± 1.5; agency= 0.66, SD± 1.19),
demonstrating that the majority of participants denied experienc-
ing ownership or agency in this control condition.
In the statistical analyses of the data, the ownership statement
was ﬁrst compared with the ownership–control statement, and the
agency statement was compared with the agency–control state-
ment, both for the synchronous condition (see Figure 2). The
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FIGURE 2 | Questionnaire data showing the average ownership and
agency ratings on a 7-point Likert scale.The senses of ownership and
agency were present (both>1) in the synchronous condition but not in the
asynchronous condition. The ownership and agency statement scores (the
means of the four statements related to ownership and agency, respectively)
were signiﬁcantly greater than their respective control statements in the
synchronous condition. Additionally, both the ownership and agency
statement scores were greater in the synchronous than asynchronous
condition (see Experiment 1: Questionnaire results for the synchronous
versus asynchronous movements). **p< .01; ***p< .001.
ownership and agency statements were then compared across con-
ditions. The participants experienced a signiﬁcant illusion of own-
ership in the synchronous condition (ownership versus ownership
control, synchronous; Z= 3.792, p< 0.001), and this illusion was
signiﬁcantly stronger than in the asynchronous condition (own-
ership, synchronous versus asynchronous: Z= 3.304, p = 0.001).
Similarly, the participants experienced a feeling of agency toward
the model hand in the synchronous condition (agency versus
agency control, synchronous;Z= 3.825,p< 0.001) thatwas signif-
icantly stronger than that in the asynchronous condition (agency
synchronous versus asynchronous: Z= 3.767, p< 0.001).
EXPERIMENT 2: PROPRIOCEPTIVE DRIFT DURING SYNCHRONOUS AND
ASYNCHRONOUS ACTIVE MOVEMENTS
After experiencing the synchronous condition, the participants’
pointing responses indicated that they perceived their right hand
to be closer to the model hand, which was above the box.
A proprioceptive drift was present in the synchronous condi-
tion (1.73 cm, SD± 2.05) but not in the asynchronous condition
(−0.35 cm, SD± 1.04), and importantly, the two conditions dis-
played a highly signiﬁcant difference (Wilcoxon signed-rank test:
Z = 3.062, p = 0.002; see Figure 3). These results complement the
questionnaire data, and together, these data provide conclusive
evidence that voluntary synchronous movements elicit the rubber
hand illusion.
The observation that the degree of proprioceptive drift toward
themodel handwas signiﬁcantly correlatedwith the questionnaire
FIGURE 3 | Results of the proprioceptive drift measurement. In the
synchronous condition, the pointing responses indicated that the
participants estimated that their right hand was closer to the model hand
(upward drift of 1.73 cm). This effect was not observed in the asynchronous
condition (see Experiment 2: Proprioceptive drift during synchronous and
asynchronous active movements).
ownership statement ratings for the synchronous condition
(Spearman r = 0.557, n = 17, p = 0.020; see Figure 4) provides
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FIGURE 4 | Correlation analysis between proprioceptive drift and the
ownership and agency ratings in the synchronous and asynchronous
conditions. As expected, the proprioceptive drift was correlated with the
level of ownership (p<0.05) but not with the level of agency (n.s.).
additional evidence for this claim (i.e., it reproduces Botvinick and
Cohen’s original observation). In the asynchronous condition, we
only observed a trend toward signiﬁcance (Spearman r = 0.457,
n = 17, p = 0.065). This signiﬁcant correlation does not change
when the outlier in the synchronous condition (level of owner-
ship of −3) is removed (Spearman r = 0.532, n = 16, p = 0.034)
or when the data from both the synchronous and asynchronous
conditions are pooled (Spearman r = 0.676, n = 34, p< 0.001).
No correlation was observed between proprioceptive drift and the
agency statement in either of the two conditions (synchronous:
Spearman r = 0.274, n = 17, p = 0.287; asynchronous: Spearman
r =−0.020, n = 17, p = 0.938). Thus, the proprioceptive drift is
related to the experience of ownership but is not related to agency.
Regrettably, questionnaire data sets from three participants were
lost and hence could not be included in this analysis.
EXPERIMENT 3: QUESTIONNAIRE DATA FOR THE ACTIVE/PASSIVE AND
CONGRUENT/INCONGRUENT MOVEMENTS
The questionnaire results clearly indicated the hypothesized pat-
tern of results: participants rated the active congruent condi-
tion positively for both ownership (2.12, SD ± 1.03) and agency
(2.52, SD± 0.55). In the active incongruent condition, agency
(2.2, SD± 0.78) was afﬁrmed, but ownership was not (−0.62,
SD± 1.62). The opposite pattern was observed in the passive con-
gruent condition, with afﬁrmative ratings for ownership (1.57,
SD± 1.3) but not agency (−0.61, SD± 1.5). Finally, in the passive
incongruent condition, the participants gave negative ratings
for ownership (−0.91, SD± 1.6) and agency (−1.5, SD± 1.64)
(see Figure 5). Thus, the hypothesized double dissociation of
ownership and agency was observed at the qualitative level.
Analysis of illusion versus control statements
A quantitative statistical analysis was ﬁrst performed to test
whether the positively rated ownership and agency statements
were signiﬁcantly higher than their corresponding control state-
ments within each condition. In the active congruent condition,
both ownership and agency were signiﬁcantly higher than the
respective control categories (ownership versus ownership con-
trol:Z= 4.940,p< 0.001; agency versus agency control:Z= 4.939,
p< 0.001). In the passive congruent condition, the ownership
statement was signiﬁcantly higher than the ownership control
statement (Z = 4.940, p< 0.001). In the active incongruent condi-
tion, the agency statement was signiﬁcantly higher than the agency
control statement (Z = 4.920, p< 0.001).
Analysis of ownership across conditions
Ownership statement scores differed signiﬁcantly across the four
conditions (Friedman test; χ2 [3, n = 32]= 65.287, p< 0.001).
To test whether manipulating the orientation of the model hand
produced the expected effect on ownership (i.e., higher owner-
ship scores in the congruent conditions), ownership scores were
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FIGURE 5 | Questionnaire data showing the mean ratings in the four
conditions.The mode of movement (active versus passive) and the
position (congruent versus incongruent) were varied. A sense of both
ownership and agency was observed in the active congruent condition.
In the passive congruent condition, participants experienced ownership
only, whereas in the active incongruent condition, only agency was
experienced. In the passive incongruent condition, neither ownership nor
agency was experienced (see Experiment 3: Questionnaire data for the
active/passive and congruent/incongruent movements). **p<0.01;
***p<0.001.
compared between the congruent conditions (active congruent
and passive congruent) and the corresponding incongruent condi-
tions (active incongruent and passive incongruent, respectively) to
determine the main effect of position on ownership score. Because
the data were not normally distributed, ANOVA was not possible.
Importantly, ownership scores were higher in both congruent con-
ditions than in the corresponding incongruent conditions (active
congruent versus active incongruent: Z= 4.863, p< 0.001; passive
congruent versus passive incongruent: Z= 4.656, p< 0.001).
We then investigated whether the mode of movement modu-
lated ownership scores (i.e., leading to higher ownership scores
during active movements than passive movements). A signif-
icant difference was observed between the active congruent
and passive congruent conditions (Z = 2.765, p< 0.01) but not
between the active incongruent and passive incongruent con-
ditions (Z = 1.961, p = 0.050) with the signiﬁcance level set to
p< 0.0125 after Bonferroni correction. Therefore, when the rub-
ber hand was in a congruent position, active movements increased
ownership ratings, whereas in the incongruent position, this effect
did not reach signiﬁcance. To test for an interaction between the
two factors (movement mode and position) across the four condi-
tions, similar to an interaction effect of ANOVA, the differences in
the individual ownership scores were calculated (active congruent
minus active incongruent and passive congruent minus passive
incongruent), and the mean values were compared. No signiﬁcant
difference was observed between the means (t = 0.744, df = 31,
p = 0.462, two-tailed).
We should also brieﬂy note here that we did not observe a sig-
niﬁcant difference in the objective measure of the rubber hand
illusion between the active and passive conditions (see Experi-
ment 4 and the proprioceptive drift measure),which together with
the lack of interaction in the questionnaire data, argues against
the notion that the participants experienced differences in the
ownership illusion in the active and passive conditions.
Analysis of agency across conditions
Similarly, the agency statement varied signiﬁcantly across the four
conditions (Friedman test; χ2 [3, n = 32]= 75.247, p< 0.001).
The ﬁrst hypothesis we examined was whether the mode of move-
ment (active or passive) had the expected effect on agency, i.e.,
higher agency scores inactive conditions than in passive condi-
tions. Agency scores were compared between the active congruent
and passive congruent conditions and between the active incon-
gruent and passive incongruent conditions, and in both cases,
the agency scores were higher in the active conditions (active
congruent versus passive congruent: Z= 4.863, p< 0.001; active
incongruent versus passive incongruent: Z= 4.772, p< 0.001).
The levels of agency were then compared between the con-
gruent conditions (active congruent and passive congruent) and
the corresponding incongruent conditions (active incongruent
and passive incongruent) to explore the possible effect of hand
position on agency (i.e., whether agency scores were higher in
the congruent conditions than in the incongruent conditions).
Here, the agency ratings were signiﬁcantly higher in the congru-
ent conditions than in the corresponding incongruent conditions
(active congruent versus active incongruent: Z = 2.631, p< 0.001;
PC versus PI: Z = 3.207, p = 0.001), with the signiﬁcance level
set at p< 0.0125 after Bonferroni correction. Notably, signiﬁcant
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differences were found in both comparisons, even between the
passive conditions (passive congruent versus passive incongruent)
in which participants did not afﬁrm experiencing agency per se.
To test for an interaction between the factors of movement
mode and hand orientation, the differences in the individual
agency scoreswere calculated (active congruentminuspassive con-
gruent and active incongruentminus passive incongruent) and the
two mean values were compared. Here, using a two-tailed test, we
found a nearly signiﬁcant difference in the means (t =−1.950,
df = 31, p = 0.060, two-tailed).
Together, these results indicate that the manipulation of the
model hand position (congruent versus incongruent, for owner-
ship) and themodeof movement (active versus passive, for agency)
are themain factors that determinewhether ownership and agency
are experienced in the present design. Furthermore, subjects gave
higher agency ratings when the arm was placed in an anatomically
congruent position, irrespective of whether the movement was
active or passive. The interaction approached signiﬁcance, which
suggests that the congruent position enhanced the level of agency
speciﬁcally in the context of ownership.
Analysis of the proportion of responders
Finally, we reasoned that the observed ratings differences between
the conditions may be rooted in either a) a general tendency to
give lower ratings for one of the conditions (i.e., lower ratings but
a similar proportion of responders) or b) different proportions
of participants experiencing an illusion (i.e., fewer responders but
similar levels of afﬁrmation reported by participants who experi-
enced an illusion). To investigate these possibilities, the ownership
and agency statements were classiﬁed as either responders (pos-
itive rating> 1) or non-responders (≤0), and the proportion of
responders for each condition was calculated and compared in a
post hoc analysis. In the active congruent and passive congruent
conditions, 87.5 and 78.1% of the participants, respectively, were
classiﬁed as ownership responders. In the active congruent and
active incongruent conditions, 96.9 and 93.8% of the participants,
respectively, were classiﬁed as agency responders. A McNemar test
revealed that there was no signiﬁcant difference between the num-
bers of ownership responders in the active congruent and passive
congruent conditions (n = 32, p = 0.375) or between the numbers
of agency responders in the active congruent and active incongru-
ent conditions (n = 32, p = 1.00). Thus, the equal proportions of
responders in the two conditions that elicited ownership or agency
indicate that the strength of these experiences among responders
produced the signiﬁcant differences in the mean ratings.
Unexpectedly, we observed a small increase in the ratings
of the agency control statements in the passive congruent and
passive incongruent conditions. However, these increases never
exceeded +1 and were thus never clearly positively rated. There-
fore, this observation does not affect any of the main comparisons
or conclusions discussed above because, in agreement with our
hypothesis, agency was inhibited in both conditions.
Correlation between ownership and agency
Interestingly, ownership and agency statements were signiﬁcantly
correlated in the active congruent condition (Spearman: r = 0.503,
n = 32, p = 0.003) but not in any of the other conditions (AI:
r = 0.198, n = 32, p = 0.277; PC: r = 0.220, n = 32, p = 0.226; PI:
r = 0.191, n = 32, p = 0.295; see Figure 6). As illustrated by the
plots inFigure 6, therewas no relationship between ownership and
agency ratingswhen themodel handwas placed in an anatomically
incongruent position.
EXPERIMENT 4: PROPRIOCEPTIVE DRIFT FOR THE ACTIVE/PASSIVE AND
CONGRUENT/INCONGRUENT MOVEMENTS
In the proprioceptive drift pointing task, clear effects were
observed in the active congruent (+0.77 cm) and passive con-
gruent (+0.6 cm) conditions but not in the active incongru-
ent (−0.35 cm) and passive incongruent (−0.004 cm) conditions.
Repeated-measures 2× 2 ANOVA revealed a signiﬁcant effect of
position (F[1,31]= 7.878, p< 0.01) but not mode of movement
generation (F[1,31]= 0.144, p = 0.707) and no signiﬁcant inter-
action between the two (see Figure 7). Thus, similar levels of
ownership, represented by the proprioceptive drift measure, were
observed when the model hand was presented in an anatomically
congruent condition, regardless of whether the movements were
active or passive.
COMPARING THE EFFECTS OF ASYNCHRONY AND PASSIVE
MOVEMENT ON AGENCY ACROSS EXPERIMENTS
The experiments described above demonstrated that both visuo-
somatic asynchrony and passive movement signiﬁcantly reduced
the sense of agency. Determining which experimental manipula-
tion was the most effective at eliminating agency had some bearing
on the underlying processes involved (see Discussion). Therefore,
the agency statement ratings were directly compared in a post hoc
test between the asynchronous condition (group mean score 0.66
in Experiment 1) and the passive congruent condition (group
mean score −0.61 in Experiment 3), using an unpaired t test.
This analysis revealed that the agency ratings in the passive con-
dition were signiﬁcantly weaker than those in the asynchronous
condition (t = 3.105, df = 50, p = 0.003, two-tailed), demonstrat-
ing that passive movement eliminated agency more completely
than visuo-somatic asynchrony.
DISCUSSION
This study yielded threemainﬁndings. First, the participants could
experience a physical, moving model hand as their own hand,
just as illusory ownership is experienced in the traditional rubber
hand illusion. Second, our results demonstrate that the feelings
of ownership and agency can be dissociated, suggesting that these
sensations represent independent processes of the human brain.
A mismatch between the observed position of the model and
the sensed position of the real hand (anatomical incongruence)
eliminates ownership but does not disrupt agency. Passive move-
ment, in contrast, eliminates agency but leaves ownership intact.
As expected, both processes require temporal congruence between
the observed movement of the model index ﬁnger and the actual
movement of the hidden index ﬁnger. Third,we found that owner-
ship modulated agency, and thus, stronger agency was experienced
when the model hand was perceived to be a part of one’s body.
Moreover, we only observed a signiﬁcant correlation between the
ownership and agency ratings in the conditions where the model
was owned. In the following sections,wediscuss how theseﬁndings
impact cognitive neuroscience research on ownership and agency.
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FIGURE 6 | Plots showing the correlations between the ownership and agency statement scores.These scores were signiﬁcantly correlated only in the
active congruent condition (r =0.503, p =0.003).
THE SENSE OF OWNERSHIP
The present results clearly show that correlated ﬁnger movements
of a model hand and a participant’s hand can elicit an illusion of
ownership over the moving model hand in the absence of tactile
stimulation by a brush or other external object, as in the clas-
sic rubber hand illusion. We observed strong afﬁrmative ratings
and signiﬁcant proprioceptive drift in the execution of both active
and passive movements as well as signiﬁcant correlations between
proprioceptive drift and the strength of ownership, as reported in
questionnaire ratings. In our experience, the ownership illusion
takes time to develop, approximately 10–30 s (anecdotal observa-
tions), which is consistent with the classic rubber hand illusion
(Ehrsson et al., 2004; Lloyd, 2007). These observations repro-
duce key observations from studies investigating the classic rubber
hand illusion elicited by applying brush strokes to the two hands
(Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson et al., 2004; Tsakiris and
Haggard, 2005). However, in the present moving rubber hand
paradigm, the sense of ownership results from a match between
spatially and temporally congruent somatic and visual informa-
tion from the moving rubber ﬁnger and the participant’s ﬁnger.
Multisensory brain areas, such as the ventral premotor cortex,
intraparietal cortex, putamen, and lateral cerebellum, likely com-
pare these signals (Graziano and Gross, 1993; Graziano, 1999;
Graziano et al., 2000; Hagura et al., 2007; Gentile et al., 2011).
Extending the ﬁndings of the classic rubber hand illusion, the
present study demonstrates that meaningful correlations among
all available sensory channels are critical for body ownership rather
than signals from a speciﬁc sensory modality, such as vision or a
particular type of peripheral somatosensory receptor. This inter-
pretation is consistent with the ﬁnding that the rubber hand
illusion can be elicited in blindfolded participants (by having them
touch a rubber right hand with their left index ﬁnger in synchrony
with touches applied to their own right hand; Ehrsson et al., 2005)
or when the cutaneous information is eliminated by anesthetizing
the digital nerves (Walsh et al., 2011).
THE SENSE OF AGENCY
The participants in our study reported a strong sense of agency
over the movements of the model hand in the active (synchro-
nous) conditions, regardless of whether the hand was placed in an
anatomically plausible position. Thus, agency was also reported
when the rubber hand was experienced as an external object,
consistent with our hypothesis that agency can be extended to
object-directed actions and tool use (see Introduction).Our results
also demonstrate that both asynchronous and passive move-
ment reduces agency. Thus, the generation of agency requires
both motor intention and a match between the predicted sen-
sory feedback and the actual sensory feedback of the movements.
Interestingly, we observed signiﬁcantly different effects of these
manipulations across the experiments. During passive movements
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FIGURE 7 | Proprioceptive drift in the four conditions of Experiment 3.
A signiﬁcant proprioceptive drift in the perceived location of the right hand
toward the model hand was observed in the two conditions in which the
model hand was placed in the anatomically congruent position to elicit the
ownership illusion (effect of position (F [1,31]=7.878, p<0.01), but the
mode of movement did not have a signiﬁcant effect (effect of mode
(F [1,31]=0.144, p =0.707); see Experiment 4: Proprioceptive drift for the
active–passive and congruent–incongruent movements).
(Experiment 3), the sense of agency broke down more completely
than in the asynchronous manipulation, in which a slightly pos-
itive level of agency remained (Experiment 1; see Comparing the
effects of asynchrony and passive movement on agency across
experiments). This ﬁnding indicates that as long as the intention
to move is present, there exists an inherent tendency to attribute
authorship of actions to the self, which is then cancelled by the
detection of mismatches between predicted sensory feedback and
actual sensory feedback. Without the intention to move (passive
movements), agency is more completely abolished because with-
out motor intention, no efference copy signals are generated from
the motor areas, and therefore, presumably no sensory conse-
quences of movement are computed (or they are predicted to be
zero). These conclusions are in agreement with those of an earlier
study by Farrer et al. (2008b), in which participants were exposed
to temporal and spatial deviations of their own movements and
were asked to judge whether the perceived movement was gen-
erated by “me,” by an “other,” or by “me” but “biased.” During
the temporal delays, the participants predominantly judged their
actions as being generated by themselves or as “biased” but not
as generated by an “other.” Thus, when the intention of action
was present, participants demonstrated a tendency to consider
this feedback or effect to be self-generated although it appeared
delayed. Therefore, the sense of agency is best explained by amodel
in which both motor intentions and comparator mechanisms are
essential contributing factors.
However, a question remains: do the senses of agency over
external objects and one’s body parts truly represent identical
neuro-cognitive processes? It can be argued that the agency expe-
rienced when the model hand was rotated was akin to the feeling
of causation elicited by moving a computer mouse on a screen
or using a tool (external agency). When the participants simul-
taneously felt agency and ownership over the model hand in a
congruent position, the experience of agency may be more similar
to that of voluntarily raising one’s arm (body agency). We did not
explicitly design the questionnaire statements to distinguish possi-
ble phenomenological differences between the agency experiences
in these two situations. However, informal interviews with the
naïve participants after the experiments at least suggest that during
synchronous movements of a congruently placed hand, the partic-
ipant genuinely experienced agency of themodel hand“exactly like
when I move my real hand.” Three speciﬁc observations suggest
that body agency may contribute an additional component over
and above the basic agency experienced when controlling an exter-
nal object. First, the participants reported signiﬁcantly stronger
agency in the active congruent condition than in the active incon-
gruent condition (p< 0.001), i.e., stronger agency when the model
hand was perceived as part of one’s body than when it was per-
ceived to be an external object. Additional support for this claim
was the observation that a (non-parametric) test for the interac-
tion between arm orientation (congruent versus incongruent) and
the mode of movement (active versus passive) almost reached sig-
niﬁcance (p = 0.06, two-tailed; see Experiment 3: Questionnaire
data for the active/passive and congruent/incongruentmovements
for details). In other words, the participants experienced the great-
est agency when the model hand was placed in an anatomically
congruent position and the ﬁnger movements were actively gener-
ated. Second,we observed a signiﬁcant correlation between agency
and ownership ratings but only in the active congruent condition,
in which participants also experienced ownership of the model
hand. This ﬁnding indicates that the experience of body agency is
more closely linked to the feeling of body ownership than to exter-
nal agency. Third, we noted stronger afﬁrmation of ownership
in the active conditions than in the passive conditions, a differ-
ence that reached signiﬁcance when the hand was presented in an
anatomically congruent position (p< 0.0125 after correction for
multiple comparisons) but not in the incongruent position. This
result indicates that body agencymay exhibit a stronger facilitatory
effect on ownership than external agency. Taken together, these
three observations provide indirect evidence that body agency is
distinct from agency over external objects. Clearly, an important
goal for future behavioral and brain-imaging studies will be to
provide objective evidence for this hypothesis.
What speciﬁc mechanisms might support body agency? When
experiencing agency over one’s body, the executed movement is
aligned with the preceding motor intention, and a match occurs
between the corresponding predicted and actual visuo-somatic
feedback from the limb in question. These sensory predictions
are ﬁne-tuned to the spatial and temporal characteristics of the
human skeletomuscular apparatus (Bays et al., 2005). This sce-
nario presumably implies that body agency is sensitive to the
spatial congruency of intended and executed movements in body-
part-centered reference frames (Graziano et al., 1997), similar to
the spatial constraint of limb ownership (Lloyd, 2007; Makin et al.,
2008). Thus, we propose that feelings potentially speciﬁcally asso-
ciated with body agency, i.e., the illusory sensation that the model
hand can be moved voluntarily just like the real hand, are related
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to the transfer of these sensorimotor integration mechanisms to
the model hand.
In contrast, agency over external objects is not constrained by
the skeletomuscular characteristics and spatial reference frames of
the human body. Instead, this type of agency relies on sensory pre-
dictions based on learned arbitrary mappings between an action
and a goal (Prinz, 2003; Spengler et al., 2009). There is evidence
that once this mapping is established and the action is linked to
a speciﬁc goal, the particular movement used to achieve this goal
is no longer of primary importance and that the action is coded
in more general goal-speciﬁc terms (Prinz, 2003). Thus, partic-
ipants can experience agency over external sensory events that
match the predicted goal of the self-generated actions, even when
these clearly violate basic anatomically plausible sensorimotor
predictions (Preston and Newport, 2010).
In addition to these speciﬁc effects, we observed higher agency
ratings in all anatomically congruent conditions that elicited illu-
sory ownership, including passive conditions in which subjects
generally denied agency. Thus, it appears that even in the absence
of an engaged agency mechanism, the presence of ownership still
drives a residual sense of agency. Consistent with this idea, Longo
et al. (2008) observed that during the traditional (static) rubber
hand illusion, participants experienced a speciﬁc feeling of con-
trol over the rubber hand, although the change in questionnaire
scores was relatively low. Intuitively, it seems plausible that an
entity that is experienced as a part of one’s body may be associated
with at least some sense of agency. Indeed, a common anecdotal
observation from the classic rubber hand illusion is that when a
person who is experiencing the illusion is asked to raise his or her
index ﬁnger, they are surprised to ﬁnd that the rubber hand does
not move, as if they had expected to be able to control it. These
observations may reﬂect a general tendency to ascribe agency to an
owned body part, which is in agreement with previous reports of
interactions between ownership and (body) agency (Tsakiris et al.,
2007b, 2010).
DOES AGENCY MODULATE OWNERSHIP?
Previous researchers have suggested the possibility that agency
supports the recognition of hand movements (van den Bos and
Jeannerod, 2002; Tsakiris et al., 2005; Shimada et al., 2009a), and
Dummer et al. (2009) observed higher ownership questionnaire
ratings for active movements than for passive movements. Our
data do not provide conclusive evidence that agency enhances
ownership. First, the proprioceptive drift did not differ signiﬁ-
cantly between the active and passive movements (consistent with
Tsakiris et al., 2006). This negative ﬁnding is crucial because our
“golden standard” for measuring body ownership is the use of a
combination of questionnaires and an objective measure, as rely-
ing on one approach alone may yield unreliable results (Rohde
et al., 2011). Nevertheless, we noted that the participants gave
higher afﬁrmative ownership scores during active movements
(mean score+ 2.12) than during passive movements (+1.57; see
Experiment 3: Questionnaire data for the active/passive and con-
gruent/incongruent movements and Figure 5). However, this dif-
ference may not be speciﬁc to agency, as we found no signiﬁcant
interaction effect between movement type and the orientation of
the arm (Experiment 3). Thus,we cannot rule out the possibility of
non-speciﬁc effects related to general differences in task demands,
either when performing active ﬁnger tapping or only relaxing the
hand, as an explanation for the slightly higher ratings in the active
conditions.
POSSIBLE NEURAL SUBSTRATES
The present behavioral results are consistent with the neuro-
physiological and neuroimaging literature in which the sense of
agency and the feeling of body ownership have been associated
with separate brain systems.Humanelectrophysiological, imaging,
and neurodisruptive studies indicate that the pre-supplementary
motor areamay be involved in generating the conscious experience
of motor intentions (Haggard, 2005; Lau et al., 2004, 2007). Fur-
thermore, functional magnetic resonance imaging studies suggest
that cerebellar regions and the right inferior parietal cortex may
be key structures for implementing the comparisons of predicted
and actual sensory feedback required for explicit agency judg-
ments (Blakemore et al., 2001; Farrer and Frith, 2002; Farrer et al.,
2003, 2008a; Blakemore and Sirigu, 2003; Tsakiris et al., 2010). In
contrast, body ownership has been associated with activation in
the ventral premotor cortex (Ehrsson et al., 2004, 2005; Petkova
et al., 2011), the intraparietal cortex (Ehrsson et al., 2004, 2005;
Petkova et al., 2011), and the putamen (Petkova et al., 2011),which
are well-known cortical nodes for integrating visual, tactile, and
proprioceptive information from the body and the space imme-
diately surrounding the body in body-part-centered coordinates
(Graziano and Gross, 1993; Fogassi et al., 1996; Graziano et al.,
1997; Duhamel et al., 1998; Graziano, 1999). Thus, our present
behavioral results that ownership and agency canbe independently
manipulated within a single rubber hand illusion paradigm may
reﬂect the different brain circuits dedicated to these processes.
However, given that both ownership and agency appear to involve
anatomically interconnected nodes within the sensorimotor brain
systems that control bodily action, additional imaging studies will
be necessary to demonstrate a double dissociation between own-
ership and agency in the context of activation maps within the
same group of subjects. Another candidate region is the posterior
insula, which has been associated with both the sense of agency
(Farrer and Frith, 2002; Farrer et al., 2003) and ownership based
on an observed correlation between the proprioceptive drift and
regional cerebral blood ﬂow in a rubber hand illusion paradigm
(Tsakiris et al., 2007a). Finally, future imaging studies should also
test the hypothesis of differences in the neural bases of body agency
and external agency.
CONCLUSION
In this study, we investigated the sense of ownership, the sense of
agency, and their potential interactions in a single experimental
setting where only one factor at a time was changed in otherwise
equivalent conditions. A match between the observed orientation
of the model and the sensed position of the hidden hand was
required for ownership (anatomically congruent position), active
movement was required for agency, and visuo-somatic synchrony
between the observed and sensed actions of the real and model
ﬁngers were required for both agency and ownership. Together,
these ﬁndings provide the ﬁrst direct demonstration of the double
dissociation of ownership and agency in a single rubber hand
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illusion paradigm. Furthermore, a speciﬁc interaction between
the two processes was observed in that agency over an owned
limb was reported as being felt more strongly than agency over
external objects. These results advance our understanding of the
critical factors involved in mediating ownership and agency and
have implications for research in neuroprosthetics, virtual reality,
and cognitive schizophrenia.
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